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  Using climate change as a prototype motivating example, this paper analyzes the 
implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of catastrophes. The paper shows 
that having an uncertain multiplicative parameter, which scales or amplifies exogenous 
shocks and is updated by Bayesian learning, induces a critical “tail fattening” of 
posterior-predictive distributions. Such fattened tails have strong implications for 
situations (like climate change) where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because 
prior knowledge cannot place sufficiently narrow bounds on overall damages. At least 
potentially, the impact on cost-benefit analysis of fat-tailed uncertainty about the scale of 
damages—coupled with a high value of statistical life—outweighs the importance of 
discounting or anything else. 
  
 On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of
Catastrophic Climate Change
Martin L. Weitzman￿
October 30, 2007. Comments appreciated.
Abstract
Using climate change as a prototype motivating example, this paper analyzes the
implications of structural uncertainty for the economics of low-probability high-impact
catastrophes. The paper is an application of the idea that having an uncertain
multiplicative parameter, which scales or ampli￿es exogenous shocks and is updated
by Bayesian learning, induces a critical ￿tail fattening￿of posterior-predictive distri-
butions. These fattened tails can have very strong implications for situations (like
climate change) where a catastrophe is theoretically possible because prior knowledge
cannot place su¢ ciently narrow bounds on overall damages. The essence of the prob-
lem is the di¢ culty of learning extreme-impact tail behavior from ￿nite data alone. At
least potentially, the in￿ uence on cost-bene￿t analysis of fat-tailed uncertainty about
the scale of damages ￿coupled with a high value of statistical life ￿can outweigh the
in￿ uence of discounting or anything else.
1 Introduction
With climate change as its intended primary application, this is a paper in applied theory
concerning the e⁄ects of structural uncertainty on the expected-utility analysis of system-
wide potential catastrophes. Warning: this paper reads more like an essay than the usual
peer-reviewed economics journal article in the sense of being an unusual mixture of abstract
￿Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138 (e-mail: mweitz-
man@harvard.edu). For helpful detailed comments on earlier drafts of this paper, but without implicating
them for its remaining defects, I am grateful to Frank Ackerman, Roland Benabou, Richard Carson, Daniel
Cole, Stephen DeCanio, Don Fullerton, Olle H￿ggstr￿m, Robert Hahn, Karl L￿fgren, Michael Mastrandrea,
Robert Mendelsohn, Gilbert Metcalf, William Nordhaus, Cedric Philibert, Richard Posner, John Reilly, Cass
Sunstein, Richard Tol, Gary Yohe, and Richard Zeckhauser.
1economic-statistical theory, mathematical rigor, verbal speculation, and back-of-the-envelope
numerical examples, which is aimed more at connecting the dots than creating any one single
brand-new dot. However, as will be explained later, I believe that such an eclectic mix is
inherently unavoidable and, moreover, it is exactly what is required in an application that
models the economics of catastrophes with an eye towards deriving and interpreting the
relevant policy implications for climate change.
In the next section I argue that it is not totally implausible (and it is not at all behaving
like a ridiculous catastrophist) to believe as a very rough ballpark estimate that eventual
mean surface temperature change relative to pre-industrial-revolution levels will be larger
than 10￿C with probability somewhere around 2%. Societies and ecosystems in a world
whose mean temperature has changed in the geologically-instantaneous time of one or two
(or even three) centuries by ￿T > 10￿C (for U.S. readers: 10￿C= 18￿F) are located in terra
incognita, since such high average temperatures have not existed for hundreds of millions of
years and such a rate of global temperature change is unprecedented perhaps even on a time
scale of billions of years. Standard conventional CBAs of climate change do not come close
to grappling seriously with this kind of potential for catastrophes, and, as will be explained
later, their policy implications therefore tend to be biased towards relative complacency.
However it is measured, the planetary welfare e⁄ects of global warming that might ac-
company a 2% chance of ￿T > 10￿C are su¢ ciently open-ended and fuzzy that it seems fair
to say o⁄hand there might be a non-negligible probability of a catastrophe. In his book
Catastrophe: Risk and Response,1 Richard A. Posner de￿nes the word catastrophe ￿... to
designate an event that is believed to have a very low probability of materializing but that
if it does materialize will produce a harm so great and sudden as to seem discontinuous with
the ￿ ow of events that preceded it.￿ Posner adds: ￿The low probability of such disasters ￿
frequently the unknown probability, as in the case of bioterrorism and abrupt global warming
￿is among the things that ba› e e⁄orts at responding rationally to them.￿ In this paper I
address what a rational economic response in the form of expected present discounted utility
theory might o⁄er in the way of guidance for thinking coherently about the economics of
highly-uncertain catastrophes with tiny but highly-unknown probabilities. I conclude that a
strong case can be made that the relatively large probabilities of climate-change catastrophes
(stemming, ultimately, from deep structural uncertainty about the prospects for disastrously
large temperature changes) dominates the possible discounting away of such future events
in calculations of expected present discounted utility.
Modeling uncertain catastrophes (such as climate change disasters) presents some very
1Posner (2004). See also the insightful review by Parson (2007). Sunstein (2007) covers some similar
themes more analytically and from a somewhat di⁄erent perspective.
2severe challenges for economic analysis, the full implications of which have not been fully con-
fronted. Cost-bene￿t analysis (CBA) based on expected utility (EU) theory has been applied
in practice primarily to cope with uncertainty in the form of known thin-tailed probability
distribution functions (PDFs). This paper shows that there is a rigorous sense in which the
relevant posterior-predictive PDF of high-impact low-probability catastrophes has a built-in
tendency to be fat tailed. A fat-tailed PDF assigns a relatively much higher probability to
rare events in the extreme tails than does a thin-tailed PDF (even thought both limiting
probabilities are miniscule).2 Not a whole lot of thought has gone into conceptualizing or
modeling what happens to EU-based CBA for fat-tailed disasters. A CBA of a situation
with known thin tails, even including whatever elements of subjective arbitrariness it might
otherwise have, can at least in principle make comforting statements of the generic form: ￿if
the PDF tails are cut o⁄ here, then EU theory will still capture an accurate approximation
of what is important.￿ Such accuracy-of-approximation PDF-cuto⁄ statements, alas, do
not exist in this generic sense for what in this paper I am calling ￿fat-tailed CBA.￿
Fat-tailed CBA can have some very strong implications that have neither been recognized
in the literature nor incorporated fully into formal CBA modeling of disasters like climate-
change catastrophes. These implications raise many disturbing questions, which will be dealt
with to some extent in the concluding sections of this paper. Not-fully-answered questions
aside, this paper will argue it is nevertheless undeniable that, at least in principle, fat-tailed
CBA is capable of turning conventional thin-tail-based climate-change policy advice on its
head. This paper will show that it is quite possible, and even numerically plausible, that
the answers to the big policy question of what to do about climate change stand or fall to
a large extent on the issue of how the high-temperature damages in the extreme fat tails
are conceptualized and modeled, an issue that has mostly been ignored thus far in formal
models. By implication, the policy advice coming out of conventional thin-tailed CBAs of
climate change must be treated with (possibly severe) scepticism until this fat tail aspect is
addressed seriously and included empirically in a true fat-tailed CBA.
Standard approaches to modeling the economics of climate change (even those that pur-
port to treat risk by Monte Carlo simulations) very likely fail to account adequately for
the implications of large uncertain impacts with small probabilities because from inductive
experience alone one cannot acquire su¢ ciently accurate information about the probabilities
of extreme tail disasters to prevent the expected marginal utility of an extra sure unit of con-
sumption from becoming unbounded for any utility function having strictly positive relative
2More technically, as I am using the term in this paper a PDF has a ￿fat￿tail when its moment generating
function (MGF) is in￿nite ￿i.e., the tail probability approaches zero more slowly than exponentially. The
standard example of a fat-tailed PDF is a power-law distribution. A PDF whose MGF is ￿nite has a ￿thin￿
tail. A normal PDF is thin-tailed as is any truncated PDF.
3risk aversion. To close the model by bounding expected marginal utility below +1 (or ex-
pected utility above ￿1), this paper relies on a concept akin to the ￿value of statistical life￿
(VSL) ￿except that here it represents something more like the rate of substitution between
consumption and the mortality risk of a catastrophic extinction of the natural world or civ-
ilization as we know these concepts. With this particular way of closing the model (which,
I will argue, is better than the alternatives), subsequent EU-based CBA will then depend
critically upon an exogenously-imposed VSL-like parameter that is a generalization of the
value of a statistical human life and is presumably very big. Practically, a high VSL-like
parameter means for situations with potentially unlimited downside exposure (like climate
change) that a Monte Carlo simulation must go very deep into the extreme-negative-impact
fat tail to merit credibility as an accurate and fair CBA. In this sense (by forcing there
to be such utter dependence upon a concept like the value of a statistical life), structural
or deep uncertainty is potentially much more of a driving force than discounting or risk for
cost-bene￿t applications of EU theory to open-ended situations with potentially unlimited
exposure. For such situations where there do not exist prior limits on damages (like climate
change from greenhouse warming), expected present discounted utility analysis of costs and
bene￿ts is likely to be dominated by considerations and concepts related more to catastrophe
insurance than to the consumption-smoothing consequences of long-term discounting at one
or another particular interest rate.
2 Generalized Climate Sensitivity as a Scaling Factor
The key unknown structural parameter in the abstract model of this paper is a critical
multiplier that ampli￿es (or scales) an uncertain exogenous shock or impulse to the system.
The purpose of this section is to motivate heuristically (and derive some ballpark numerical
estimates for) this kind of scaling factor in a context of climate change. Very roughly ￿at a
high level of abstraction and without trying to push an imperfect analogy too far ￿the generic
role of this uncertain multiplicative ampli￿er or scale parameter can be illustrated by the
role of uncertain ￿climate sensitivity￿in discussions of global warming. Climate sensitivity
is an indispensably useful macro-indicator of the aggregate response of temperature change
to the aggregate level of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Let ￿lnCO2 be sustained relative
change in concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide while ￿T is equilibrium temperature
response. Narrowly de￿ned, climate sensitivity (here denoted S1) is a benchmark amplifying
or scaling multiplier for converting ￿lnCO2 into ￿T by the (reasonably accurate) linear
approximation ￿T ￿ (S1=ln2)￿￿lnCO2. As the International Panel on Climate Change
in its IPCC4 (2007) Executive Summary phrases it: ￿The equilibrium climate sensitivity is a
4measure of the climate system response to sustained radiative forcing. It is not a projection
but is de￿ned as the global average surface warming following a doubling of carbon dioxide
concentrations. It is likely to be in the range 2 to 4.5￿C with a best estimate of 3￿C, and
is very unlikely to be less than 1.5￿C. Values substantially higher than 4.5￿C cannot be
excluded, but agreement of models with observations is not as good for those values.￿ (For
IPCC4, ￿likely￿is P > 66%, while ￿very unlikely￿is P < 10%.) Climate sensitivity is
not nearly the same thing as ultimate temperature change, but for the benchmark-serving
purposes of my simplistic example I assume that the shapes of both PDFs are very roughly
similar because a doubling of CO2-equivalent (CO2-e) greenhouse gases (GHGs) within the
next half-century is very highly likely.
In this paper I am mostly concerned with the 17% of those S1 ￿values substantially
higher than 4.5￿C￿which ￿cannot be excluded.￿ A grand total of twenty-two recent studies
of climate sensitivity encompassing a variety of methodologies, along with their 22 accompa-
nying PDFs of S1, lie indirectly behind the above-quoted IPCC4 (2007) summary statement.
These 22 studies cited by IPCC4 are compiled in Table 9.3 and Box 10.5. The 22 studies
are of uneven reliability, but for the simplistic purposes of this illustrative example I do
not perform any kind of formal meta-analysis or Bayesian model averaging. Instead I just
naively assume that all 22 studies have equal credibility. From glancing at Table 9.3 and
Box 10.2 of IPCC4, it is apparent that the upper tails of these 22 PDFs tend to be long
and fat. The empirical reason why these upper tails are long and fat dovetails beautifully
with the theory of this paper: inductive knowledge is always useful, but simultaneously it is
limited in what it can tell us about extreme events outside the range of experience, in which
case one is forced back onto depending more than one might wish upon the prior PDF, which
of necessity is largely subjective and relatively di⁄use.3
The upper 5% probability level averaged over all 22 climate-sensitivity studies cited in
IPCC4 (2007) is 7￿C while the median is 6.4￿C,4 which I take as signifying approximately
3A more technically-correct explanation goes roughly along the following lines. Let ￿F stand for ￿changes
in radiative forcing￿ that induce (approximately) linear temperature responses ￿T. The most relevant
￿forcing￿for climate change is ￿F = ￿lnCO2, but there are many other examples of ￿forcing￿such as
aerosols, particulates, ozone, solar, volcanic, etc. Attempts to identify S1 in the 22 IPCC4-cited studies
are roughly akin to measuring ￿T=￿F for various values of ￿F and ￿T. The problem is the presence of
signi￿cant uncertainties in measurements and model parameterizations. This produces a long fat tail in the
inferred posterior-predictive PDF of S1 ￿for reasons that, while not identical, are structurally similar to the
generic inference problem in the model of this paper. For more details on ￿why is climate sensitivity so
unpredictable?￿see the recent Science article with the same title by Roe and Baker (2007).
4Details of this calculation are available from the author upon request. Eleven of the studies in Table 9.3
overlap with the studies portrayed in Box 10.2. Four of these overlapping studies con￿ ict on the numbers
given for the upper 5% level. For three of these di⁄erences I chose the Table 9.3 values on the grounds that
all of the Box 10.2 values had been modi￿ed from the original studies to make them have zero probability
mass above 10￿C. (The fact that all PDFs in Box 10.2 have been normalized to zero probability above 10￿C
5that P[S1 > 7￿C] ￿ 4-5%. An important supplementary component, which conceptu-
ally should be added on to climate sensitivity S1, is the ampli￿cation of positive-feedback
greenhouse warming due to heat-induced releases of the immense amounts of GHGs (mostly
methane, which is a particularly potent GHG) that are currently sequestered in arctic per-
mafrost. A yet-more-remote possibility that also ought to be included is high-temperature-
induced releases of the even-much-vaster deposits of o⁄shore methane hydrates, which has
a low but not-zero probability of escaping into the atmosphere at temperatures above 7￿C
and could potentially produce a horrendously catastrophic runaway-positive-feedback sit-
uation. The very real possibility of endogenous heat-triggered releases of vast amounts
of currently-sequestered GHGs at high temperatures is a good example of supplementary
feedback e⁄ects that I would want to include in the abstract interpretation of a concept of
￿climate sensitivity￿that is relevant for this paper. What matters for the economic analysis
of climate change is the reduced-form relationship between anthropogenically-injected CO2-e
GHG levels and temperature change. Instead of S1, which stands for ￿climate sensitivity
narrowly de￿ned￿(and does not include possible heat-induced releases of sequestered GHGs
or other such feedbacks), I work throughout the rest of this paper with S2, which stands for
a more abstract ￿generalized climate-sensitivity-like scaling parameter￿(that includes feed-
backs like possible heat-induced releases of sequestered GHGs). The relationship between
￿ln[anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHGs] and ￿T is not linear (it is arguably more likely
than not to be stronger than linear), but for the purposes of this highly-aggregated example
the linear approximation is good enough. This implies that a doubling of anthropogenically-
injected CO2-e GHGs results in approximate equilibrium temperature change ￿T ￿ S2.
The main point here is that the PDF of S2 has an even-longer even-fatter tail than the
PDF of S1. One recent study5 can be interpreted as suggesting that the endogenous high-
temperature-induced release of sequestered GHGs might shift the upper end of the PDF of
S2 some 2￿C or so to the right of the PDF of S1. This could imply that P[S2 > 9￿C] ￿ 4-
5%. The tails of the PDFs of S1 in Table 9.3 and Box 10.2 of IPCC4 (2007) are su¢ ciently
fat that without further ado I am just going to assume for the purposes of this simplistic
example that P[S2 > 10￿C] ￿ 2%. This is an extraordinarily crude and casual ballpark
estimate of what amounts to huge climate impacts with tiny probabilities, but the subject
matter of this paper concerns just such kind of situations and my overly simplistic example
biases my averages on the low side.) With the fourth con￿ ict (Gregory et al (2002a)), I substituted 8.2￿C
from Box 10.2 for the 1 in Table 9.3 (which again biases my averages on the low side, but the 1 was
arti￿cially due to the lack of serious attention being paid in this study to pinning down the upper tail). The
only other modi￿cation was to average the three reported volcanic-forcing values of Wigley et al (2005a) in
Table 9.3 into one study with the single value of 6.4￿C.
5Torn and Harte (2007), based on a study of the 360,000-year record from Antarctic ice cores of global
temperatures, along with associated levels of carbon dioxide and methane .
6here does not depend on precise numbers or speci￿cations. To the contrary, the major point
of this paper is that such numbers and speci￿cations must be imprecise and that this is a
hugely-signi￿cant part of the climate-change problem.
Stabilizing anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHG stocks at anything like twice pre-
industrial-revolution levels looks now like an extraordinarily ambitious goal. Given current
trends in emissions, we will attain such a doubling of anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHG
levels within about forty years and will then go far beyond that amount unless relatively
drastic measures are taken starting soon. Projecting current trends in business-as-usual
GHG emissions, a tripling of anthropogenically-injected CO2-e GHG concentrations would
be attained relative to pre-industrial-revolution levels well within a century from now. Coun-
tering this e⁄ect is the idea that we just might begin someday to seriously cut back on GHG
emissions (especially if we learn that a catastrophe is looming ￿although there are very
long inertial lags in the transmission pipeline converting GHGs into temperature increases
that might limit this option). On the other hand, maybe currently-underdeveloped coun-
tries like China and India will develop and industrialize at a blistering pace in the future
with even more GHG emissions and less GHG emissions controls than have thus far been
projected. Or, who knows, we might discover some revolutionary new carbon-free energy
source or carbon-￿xing technological breakthrough. Maybe the future marginal product
of capital will change dramatically. Yet again, there is the unknown role of geoengineer-
ing. And so forth and so on. For the purposes of this very crude example, I cut through
this morass of climate-change uncertainty by sticking with the overly simplistic story that
P[S2 > 10￿C] ￿ P[￿T > 10￿C] ￿ 2%. To repeat: the main point of this example does not
depend on the exact numbers or speci￿cations in this drastically oversimpli￿ed story, and if
anything is enhanced by the uncertainty.
It is di¢ cult to imagine what ￿T > 10￿C might mean for life on earth, but such high
temperatures have not been seen for hundreds of millions of years. Global average warming of
10￿C masks tremendous local and seasonal variation, which can be expected to produce tem-
perature increases much greater than this at particular times in particular places. Because
this hypothetical temperature change of 10￿C (=18￿F) would be geologically instantaneous,
it would e⁄ectively destroy planet earth as we know it. At a minimum it would trigger
genuinely massive species extinctions and monumental ecosystem changes. There exist some
truly terrifying examples of possible consequences of mean temperature increases ￿10￿C,
such as: disintegration of the Greenland and at least the Western part of the Antarctic ice
sheets with dramatic raising of sea level by perhaps 25 meters or so, shutdowns or perhaps
even reversals of thermohaline oceanic circulation systems like the Gulf Stream, complete
disruption of large-scale weather patterns like monsoons and droughts, highly consequential
7worldwide changes in regional freshwater availability and regional deserti￿cation ￿and so
forth and so on.
All of the above-mentioned horrifying examples of climate-change mega-disasters are
incontrovertibly possible on a time scale of centuries. They were purposely selected to come
across as being especially lurid in order to drive home a valid point. The tiny probabilities
of nightmare impacts of climate change are all such crude ballpark estimates that there is
a tendency in the literature to dismiss altogether these highly uncertain forecasts on the
￿scienti￿c￿grounds that they are much too speculative to be taken seriously. In a classical-
frequentist mindset, the tiny probabilities of nightmare catastrophes are so close to zero
that they are highly statistically insigni￿cant at any standard con￿dence level and one￿ s
￿rst impulse can understandably be to just ignore them. The main theme of this paper
stands in sharp contrast with the conventional wisdom of not taking seriously extreme-
temperature-change probabilities because such probability estimates are highly speculative
and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The purpose of this paper is to prove that
the exact opposite logic holds by giving a rigorous Bayesian sense in which, other things
being equal, the more speculative and fuzzy are the tiny tail probabilities of high-impact
extreme events, the less ignorable and the more serious is the situation for a risk-averse agent
whose welfare is measured by present discounted expected utility. The seriousness of such
situations comes from combining strictly positive relative risk aversion with a multiplicative
factor (playing a role analogous to S2) that e⁄ectively has open-ended uncertainty. Such a
structure is capable of amplifying impulses into bad impacts with long fat tails.
Oversimplifying enormously here, how warm the climate ultimately gets is approximately
a product of two factors ￿(some monotone function of) the amount of anthropogenically-
injected CO2-e GHG concentrations and a critical climate-sensitivity-like scaling multiplier.
Both of these factors are uncertain, but the scaling parameter is much more open-ended on
the high side with a much longer and fatter upper tail. This critical scale parameter re￿ ect-
ing large scienti￿c uncertainty is then used as a multiplier for converting aggregated GHG
emissions ￿an input mostly re￿ ecting economic uncertainty ￿into eventual temperature
changes. Suppose the true value of this scaling parameter is unknown because of limited
past experience, a situation that can be modeled as if inferences must be made inductively
from a ￿nite number of data observations. At a su¢ ciently high level of abstraction, each
data point might be interpreted as representing an outcome from a particular scienti￿c or
economic study. (Some of the scienti￿c studies of climate sensitivity might actually be
examples of this because they rely on noisy temperature responses from past natural exper-
iments of changed radiative forcings of unsure magnitude.) This paper shows that having
an uncertain scale parameter in such a setup can add a signi￿cant tail-fattening e⁄ect to
8posterior-predictive PDFs, even when Bayesian learning takes place with arbitrarily large
(but ￿nite) amounts of data. Loosely speaking, the driving mechanism is that the op-
eration of taking ￿expectations of expectations￿or ￿probability distributions of probability
distributions￿spreads apart and fattens the tails of the reduced-form compounded posterior-
predictive PDF. It is inherently di¢ cult to learn extreme bad-tail probabilities from ￿nite
samples alone because, by de￿nition, we don￿ t get many data-point observations of such
catastrophes. Therefore, rare disasters located in the stretched-out fattened tails of such
posterior-predictive distributions must inherently contain an irreducibly-large component of
deep structural uncertainty. The underlying sampling-theory principle is that the rarer is
an event, the more unsure is our estimate of its probability of occurrence. In this spirit
(from being constructed out of inductive knowledge), the empirical studies of climate sensi-
tivity are perhaps preordained to ￿nd the fat-tailed power-law-like PDFs which they seem,
approximately, to ￿nd in practice. The paper will show that a generalization of this form of
interaction can be re-packaged and analyzed as an aggregative macroeconomic model with
essentially the same reduced form (structural uncertainty about some unknown open-ended
scale-multiplying parameter amplifying an uncertain economic input). This form of inter-
action (coupled with ￿nite data, under conditions of relative risk aversion) can have very
strong consequences for CBA when catastrophes are theoretically possible, because in such
circumstances it can easily drive applications of expected utility (EU) theory much more
than anything else, including discounting.
When fed back into an economic analysis, the great open-ended uncertainty about even-
tual mean planetary temperature change cascades into yet-greater yet-more-open-ended un-
certainty about eventual changes in utility or welfare. Not only is it very di¢ cult to estimate
tail probabilities of high-￿T outcomes, but translating this via ambiguous local and sea-
sonal weather consequences combined with unknown adaptation capabilities into aggregated
representative-agent utility-equivalent consumption-loss units for people living a century or
two from now introduces enormous further fuzziness. When such future consumption-
utility includes the existence values placed by people at that time on wild species, in situ
conservation, natural or historical habitats, and the availability of outdoor activities more
generally, the already-huge welfare uncertainties are yet further compounded.
Even if a generalized climate-sensitivity-like scaling parameter like S2 could be bounded
above by some big number, the value of what might be called ￿welfare sensitivity￿is ef-
fectively bounded only by some very big number representing something like the value of
statistical civilization as we know it or maybe even the value of statistical life on earth as we
know it. This is the essential point of this simplistic motivating example. Suppose it were
granted for the sake of argument that an abstract climate-sensitivity-like scaling parameter
9can somehow be constrained at the upper end by some fundamental law of physics that as-
signs a probability of exactly zero to temperature changes being above some critical physical
constant of nature analogous to the speed of light. (This is not true incidentally, because
the true situation is more like a case of the ever-tinier probabilities associated with ever-
higher temperatures trailing o⁄asymptotically to zero than it is like a case of hitting exactly
zero probability at some upper-bound physical constant analogous to a lower-bound climate
sensitivity like zero.) Even so, the essential point here is that the enormous uncertainty
about (and enormous sensitivity of CBA to) an arbitrarily-imposed ￿damages function￿for
big temperature changes makes the relevant reduced-form criterion of ￿welfare sensitivity￿
to a fat-tailed generalized scaling parameter seem almost unbelievably uncertain for very
high temperatures ￿to the point of being essentially unbounded.
3 A Disturbing Example
Let C be consumption. Consider a representative agent with a standard CRRA (constant









Technically speaking, the model of this paper requires only that the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion ￿ is positive. But the main application here involves a situation where the
value of statistical life is extremely large, which, it will turn out, is essentially only consistent
with ￿ > 1. Although the condition ￿ > 1 can be derived from the model (and later it will
be), analytically it is easier just to assume it in the ￿rst place.
For analytical crispness, the model of this paper has only two periods ￿the present and
the future. Applied to climate change, the future would be one or two centuries hence.
Such a sharp formulation downplays the ability to learn and adapt gradually over time but I
believe the key insights of this model would remain, mutatis mutandus, for most applications
￿including the economics of climate change.
Instead of working directly with C, in this paper it is more convenient to work with (and
think in terms of) lnC. If present consumption is normalized to unity, then the growth of
consumption between the two periods is
Y ￿ lnC; (3)
10where in this model Y is a random variable capturing all uncertainty that in￿ uences fu-
ture values of lnC. For the purposes of this paper, Y includes not just economic growth
narrowly de￿ned, but also the consumption-equivalent damages of adverse climate change.
Actually, this paper is mostly concerned with the extraordinarily-small probability of an
extraordinarily-large negative realization of Y that might accompany extreme climate change.
Starting here and continuing throughout the rest of this paper, Y encapsulates the reduced-
form uncertainty that is at the abstract core of an economic analysis of climate change: the
relationship between uncertain welfare-equivalent C and uncertain ￿T. Thus, the random
variable Y is to be interpreted as implicitly being some monotone-decreasing function of the
random variable ￿T of form Y = F(￿T) with F 0 < 0, so that (3) means C = exp(F(￿T)).





for time-preference parameter ￿ (0 < ￿ ￿ 1). When (2) holds, then from (4) the amount
of present consumption that the agent would be willing to give up in the present period to
obtain one extra sure unit of consumption in the future period is
E[M] = ￿E[exp(￿￿Y )]; (5)
which is a kind of shadow price for discounting future costs and bene￿ts in project analysis.
Throughout this paper I use the price of a future sure unit of consumption as the single
most useful overall indicator of the present cost of future uncertainty. Other like indicators ￿
such as welfare-equivalent deterministic consumption ￿give similar results, but the required
analysis in terms of mean-preserving spreads is slightly more elaborate and slightly less
intuitive. Focusing on the behavior of E[M] is understood in this paper, therefore, as being
a metaphor for understanding what drives the results of cost-bene￿t or welfare analysis more
generally in situations of potentially unlimited exposure to catastrophic impacts.
Using standard notation, let lower-case y denote a realization of the upper-case random






which means that E[M] is ￿essentially￿the Laplace transform or moment-generating function
of f(y). This is helpful because the properties of the expected stochastic discount factor are
the same as the properties of the moment-generating function of a probability distribution,
11about which a great deal is already understood. For example, if Y ￿ N(￿;s2) then plugging












where ￿ = ￿ln￿ is the instantaneous rate of pure time preference. Expression (7) shows
up in innumerable asset-pricing Euler-equation applications as the expected value of the
stochastic discount factor or pricing kernel when consumption is lognormally distributed.
Equation (7) is also the basis of the well-known generalized-Ramsey formula for the riskfree
interest rate
r






which (in its deterministic form, for the special case s = 0) plays a key role in recent debates
about what social interest rate to use for intergenerational cost-bene￿t discounting of policies
to mitigate GHG emissions. This intergenerational-discounting debate has mainly revolved
around choosing ￿ethical￿values of the rate of pure time preference ￿, but this paper will
demonstrate that, for any ￿>0, the e⁄ect of ￿ in formula (8) is theoretically overshadowed
by the e⁄ect of an uncertain scaling parameter s.
Although not phrased in exactly this way, the existing literature already contains an
example that can be interpreted as showing a sense in which EU-maximizing agents are
signi￿cantly more averse to structural ￿uncertainty￿(meaning here a situation where the
structure of the data generating process is unknown and must be estimated statistically)
than they are to pure ￿risk￿(the structure of the data generating process is known, but fu-
ture stochastic realizations are unknown ￿as in (8) where Y ￿ N(￿;s2) with both parameters
known). The example used here to convey this basic idea is a relatively simple speci￿ca-
tion consisting of the workhorse isoelastic or CRRA utility function (1) along with familiar
probability distributions: lognormal, Student-t, gamma.6 One may then ask whether the
insight that structural ￿uncertainty￿has potentially more impact on EU analysis than pure
￿risk￿is due here to the particular quirks of this relatively simple example or, alternatively,
it represents a generic insight of broader scope. The answer, given in the next section, is
that the result is generic (or at least much broader than the example). The relatively simple
formulation of this section will then help to motivate the subsequent development of a more
6The example in this section with these particular functional forms leading to existence problems from
inde￿nite expected-utility integrals blowing up was ￿rst articulated in the important pioneering note of
Geweke (2001). Weitzman (2007a) extended this example to a nonergodic evolutionary stochastic process
and developed the implications for asset pricing in a nonstationary setting. For the application here to the
economics of catastrophic climate change I believe the nonergodic evolutionary formulation is actually more
relevant and gives stronger insights, but it is just not worth the additional complexity for what is essentially
an applied paper whose basic points are su¢ ciently adequately conveyed by the simpler stationary case.
12general theory of catastrophic change involving structural uncertainty about the true value
of the relevant scale parameter.
Throughout this paper, the structural scale parameter controlling the tail spread of a
probability distribution is the most critical unknown. For convenience in the super-simple
example of this section, it is assumed that Y ￿ N(￿;s2) where the mean ￿ is known but
the scale parameter s is unknown. In an extremely loose sense this unknown structural scale
parameter is a highly-stylized abstraction of the e⁄ect that is embodied in an uncertain
generalized climate-sensitivity-like amplifying multiplier like S2, which was discussed in the
previous section of the paper. With this rough analogy in this super-simple example, Y $
A ￿ B￿T, where A and B are positive constants.
The structural uncertainty concerning s is modeled here as if this scale parameter is
a subjectively-distributed random variable (denoted S) whose PDF must be inferred by
inductive reasoning from n observed data points. At a very high level of abstraction, these
data points might be interpreted as outcomes from various economic-scienti￿c studies very
roughly akin to the eighteen climate-sensitivity studies discussed in the introduction. Let
y = (y1;:::;yn) be a sample of n i.i.d. random draws from the data-generating process of the
normal distribution whose PDF is





























In a Bayesian framework, deriving the agent￿ s posterior distribution of S requires that
some prior distribution be imposed on S. The choice of a ￿noninformative￿prior in the
most general case represents a thorny issue within Bayesian statistics. However, for the
particular case of a one-dimensional scale parameter, which is the case here, practically all
de￿nitions of a ￿noninformative￿prior give the same PDF. This traditional reference prior
forms the Bayesian mirror image of classical linear-normal regression analysis. This prior
(called Je⁄reys prior, which is explained in any textbook on Bayesian statistics) is a di⁄use
or uniform distribution of lnS on (0;1), meaning that the (improper) prior PDF expressed









The posterior probability density is proportional to the product of the prior p0(s) times
the likelihood L(s;y). When the change of variables (13) is plugged into the product of














The mean of the gamma distribution (14) is a=b while its variance is a=b2, so that from
(15) and (16),













After integrating out the precision from the conditional-normal distribution (9), the un-





￿ exp(￿￿(y ￿ ￿)
2=2) ￿(￿)d￿: (19)
Straightforward brute-force integration of (19) (for (14), (15), (16)) shows that f(y) is








14(Any Bayesian textbook shows that a normal with gamma precision becomes a Student-t).
Note that, asymptotically, the limiting tail behavior of (20) is a fat-tailed power-law PDF
whose exponent is n + 1. In the next section of the paper, this same kind of power-law-tail
result will be shown to hold much more generally than the particular example of this section.
When the posterior-predictive distribution of Y is (20) (from s being unknown), then (6)
becomes
E[M] = +1; (21)
because the moment-generating function of a Student-t distribution is in￿nite. What ac-
counts technically for the economically-stunning counterintuitiveness of the ￿nding (21) is
a form of pointwise but nonuniform convergence. When n ! 1 in (20), f(y) becomes
the familiar normal form exp(￿(y ￿ ￿)2=2￿2
1), which then, as y ! ￿1, approaches zero
faster than exp(￿￿y) approaches in￿nity, thereby leading to the well-known ￿nite formula
(7) for E[M]. Given any ￿xed n, on the other hand, as y ! ￿1 expression (20) tends to
zero only as fast as the power-law polynomial (￿y)￿n￿1, so that now in formula (6) it is the
exponential term exp(￿￿y) that dominates asymptotically, thereby causing E[M] ! +1.
Something quite extraordinary seems to be happening here, which is crying out for further
elucidation! Thousands of applications of EU theory in thousands of articles and books are
based on formulas like (7) or (8). Yet when it is acknowledged that s is unknown (with a
standard noninformative reference prior) and its value in formula (7) or (8) must instead be
inferred as if from a data sample that can be arbitrarily large (but ￿nite), expected marginal
utility explodes in (21). The question then naturally arises: what is EU theory trying to
tell us when its conclusions for a host of important applications ￿in CBA, asset pricing, and
many other ￿elds of economics ￿seem so sensitive merely to the recognition that conditioned
on ￿nite realized data the distribution implied by the normal is the Student-t?
I want to emphasize as emphatically as I can at this relatively early stage of the paper
that the problem (both here and throughout the rest of the paper) is not a mathematically il-
legitimate use of the symbol 1 in formula (21), which incorrectly seems to o⁄er a deceptively
easy way out of the dilemma that E[M] ! +1 by somehow discrediting this application
of EU theory on the narrow grounds that in￿nities are not allowed in a legitimate theory
of choice under uncertainty. It is easy to put arbitrary bounds on utility functions, or to
truncate probability distributions arbitrarily, or to introduce ad hoc priors that arbitrarily
cut o⁄ or otherwise severely dampen high values of S or low values of C. Introducing any
of these changes formally closes the model in the sense of replacing the symbol 1 by an
arbitrarily-large but ￿nite number. Indeed, the model of this paper will be closed later in
just such a fashion by placing a lower bound on consumption of the form C ￿ D, where
the lower bound D(￿) > 0 is de￿ned indirectly by a ￿value of statistical life￿parameter ￿.
15However, removing the in￿nity symbol in this or any other way does not eliminate (or even
marginalize) the underlying problem because it then comes back to haunt in the form of
an arbitrarily large expected stochastic discount factor, whose exact value depends hyper-
sensitively upon obscure bounds, truncations, severely-dampened or cut-o⁄ prior PDFs, or
whatever other tricks have been used to banish the 1 symbol. One can easily remove the
1 in formula (21), but one cannot so easily remove the underlying economic problem that
expected stochastic discount factors ￿which lie at the heart of cost-bene￿t, asset-pricing,
and many other important applications of EU theory ￿can become arbitrarily large just
by making what seem like unobjectionable statistical inferences about limiting tail behavior.
The take-away message here is that reasonable attempts to constrict the length or the fatness
of the ￿bad￿tail (or to modify the utility function) still can leave us with uncomfortably big
numbers whose exact value depends non-robustly upon arti￿cial constraints or parameter
settings that we really do not understand. The only legitimate way to avoid this potential
problem is when there exists strong a priori knowledge that contains the damages (e.g.,
as with limited downside exposure from an independently distributed sub-component of a
consumption-wealth portfolio).
What is happening in this example is a particular instance of a general idea. To repeat:
the core underlying problem is the di¢ culty of learning limiting tail behavior inductively
from ￿nite data. Seemingly thin-tailed probability distributions (like here the normal),
which are actually only thin-tailed conditional on known structural parameters of the model,
become tail-fattened (like here the Student-t) after integrating out the uncertainty. This core
issue cannot be eliminated in any clean way, and with unlimited downside exposure it must
in￿ uence any utility function that is sensitive to low values of consumption. It is important
to grasp that utility isoelasticity per se is inessential to the reasoning here (although it makes
the argument easier to understand), because the expected stochastic discount factor E[M]




The Student-t ￿child￿posterior-predictive density from a large number of observations
looks almost exactly like its bell-shaped normal ￿parent￿except that the probabilities are
somewhat more stretched out, making the tails appear relatively fatter at the expense of
a slightly-￿ atter center. Intuitively, a normal density ￿becomes￿a Student-t from a tail-
fattening spreading-apart of probabilities caused by the variance of the normal having itself
a (inverted gamma) probability distribution. It is then no surprise from EU theory that
people are more averse qualitatively to a relatively fat-tailed Student-t posterior-predictive
child distribution than they are to the relatively thin-tailed normal parent which begets it.
A perhaps more surprising consequence of EU theory is the quantitative strength of this
16endogenously-derived aversion to the e⁄ects of unknown tail-structure. The story behind
this quantitative strength is that fattened-posterior bad tails represent structural or deep
uncertainty about the possibility of rare high-impact disasters that ￿using colorful language
here ￿￿scare￿any agent having a utility function with strictly positive relative risk aversion.
One obvious technical way for the model to contain this scary ￿Student-t explosion￿(or,
more generally, ￿power-law-tail explosion￿ ) is to exclude it a priori by imposing some kind
or another of an absolute lower bound D > 0 on allowed values of C ￿ D.
The next issue to be investigated is the extent to which this particular example gener-
alizes. It turns out that there is a rigorous sense in which this scary fattened-posterior-tail
e⁄ect holds for (essentially) any probability distribution characterized by having an uncer-
tain scale parameter. When indeterminateness is compounded by probability distributions
themselves having probability distributions, then posterior-predictive tails must inevitably
become fattened ￿with potentially strong consequences for some important applications of
EU theory, including the economic analysis of climate change.
4 The General Model
In order to focus sharply on structural parameter uncertainty, the model of this section is
patterned closely as a generalization of last section￿ s example and is deliberately sparse.
To create families of probability distributions that are simultaneously fairly general and
analytically tractable, the following generating mechanism is employed. Suppose Z repre-









2 ￿(z)dz = 1: (23)
It should be noted that the PDF ￿(z) is allowed to be extremely general. For example,
the distribution of Z might have ￿nite support (like the uniform distribution, which signi￿es
that unbounded catastrophes will be absolutely excluded conditional on the value of the
￿nite lower support being known), or it might have unbounded range (like the normal,
which allows unbounded catastrophes to occur but assigns them a thin bad tail conditional
on the variance being known). The only restrictions placed on ￿(z) are the extremely weak
regularity or technical conditions that ￿(z) is strictly positive within some neighborhood of
17z = 0, and that
1 Z
￿1
exp(￿￿z)￿(z)dz < 1 (24)
for all ￿ > 0, which is automatically satis￿ed if Z has ￿nite lower support.
With s > 0 given, make the change of random variable of the linear form y = sz + ￿,
which implies that the conditional PDF of y is









where s and ￿ are structural parameters having the interpretations
￿ = E[Y j s] =
1 Z
￿1
y h(y j s) dy (26)
and
s




2 h(y j s) dy: (27)
For this paper, what matters most is structural uncertainty about the scale parameter
controlling the tail spread of a probability distribution, which is the most critical unknown
in this setup. This scale parameter s may be conceptualized extremely loosely as a highly-
stylized abstract generalization of a climate-sensitivity-like amplifying or scaling multiplier
like S2. (In this crude analogy, Z $ ￿lnCO2=ln2, SZ $ ￿T, Y $ A￿B￿T.) Without
signi￿cant loss of generality, it is assumed for ease of exposition that in (25) the mean ￿ is
known, while the standard-deviation scale parameter s is unknown. The case where ￿ and
s are both unknown involves more intricate notation but otherwise gives essentially identical
results.
The point of departure here is that the conditional PDF of growth rates h(y j s) given
by (25) is known to the agent and, while the true value of s is unknown, the situation is as
if some ￿nite number of i.i.d. observations are available on which to base an estimate of s
by some process of inductive reasoning. Suppose that the agent has observed the random
sample y = (y1;:::;yn) of growth-rate data realizations from n independent draws of the
distribution h(y j s) de￿ned by (25) for some unknown ￿xed value of s. An example relevant
to this paper is where the sample space represents the outcomes of various economic-scienti￿c
studies and the data y = (y1;:::;yn) are interpreted at a very high level of abstraction as
the ￿ndings of n such studies, so that n here is then a measure of the degree of inductive
18knowledge of the situation.




h(yj j s): (28)
The prior PDF of S is taken to be a generalization of (12) of the form
p0(s) _ s
￿k (29)
for any number k. (The number k is roughly identi￿able with the strength of prior knowledge
in the same spirit as n is roughly identi￿able with the strength of inductive knowledge.)
Since k can be chosen to be arbitrarily large, the non-dogmatic prior distribution (29) can
be made to place arbitrarily small prior probability weight on big values of s. It should be
appreciated that any invariant prior must be of the form (29). Invariance (discussed in the
Bayesian-statistical literature) is considered desirable as a description of a ￿noninformative￿
reference prior that favors no particular value of the scaling parameter s over any other.
For such a noninformative reference prior, it seems reasonable to impose a condition of scale
invariance that might be justi￿ed by the following kind of reasoning. If the action taken
in a decision problem should not depend upon the unit of measurement, then a plausible
principle of scale-parameter invariance might ask of a prior representing a state of ignorance
that
p0(s) _ p0(￿s); (30)
and the only way that (30) can then hold for all ￿ > 0 and all s > 0 is when the (necessarily
improper) PDF is of the form (29).
The posterior probability density pn(s jy) is proportional to the product of the prior p0(s)
from (29) multiplied by the likelihood L(s;y) from (28), which here yields
pn(s j y) _ p0(s)
n Y
j=1
h(yj j s): (31)
Integrating out the agent￿ s uncertainty about s described by the probability density (31),





h(y j s) pn(s j y) ds; (32)






5 The Key Role of a ￿VSL-like Parameter￿
To jump ahead of the story just a bit, the general model of Section 3 has essentially the same
unsettling property as the disturbing example of Section 2 ￿namely that E[M] is unbounded.
Technically, for the analysis to proceed further some mathematical mechanism is required to
close the model by bounding E[M] . A variety of bounding mechanisms are possible, with
the broad general conclusions of the model not being tied to any one particular mechanism.
In this paper I close the model by placing an ad hoc positive lower bound on consumption,
which is denoted D (for ￿death￿ ). This lower bound D is not completely arbitrary, however,
because it can be related conceptually to a kind of ￿value of statistical life￿(VSL) parameter.
This has the advantage of tying conclusions to a familiar economic concept whose ballpark
estimates can at least convey some very crude quantitative implications for the economics
of climate change. In this empirical sense the glass is half full (which is more than can be
said for other ways of closing this model). However, the glass is half empty in the empirical
sense that an accurate CBA of climate change can end up being distressingly dependent on
some very large VSL-like coe¢ cient about whose size we are highly unsure.
The critical coe¢ cient that is behind the lower bound on consumption is called the VSL-
like parameter and is denoted ￿. This ￿VSL-like parameter￿￿ is intended to be akin to the
already-somewhat-vague concept of the value of a human statistical life, only in the context
here it represents the yet-far-fuzzier concept of something more like the value of statistical
life on earth as we know it, or perhaps the value of statistical civilization as we know it.
In this paper I am going to take ￿ to be some very big number that indirectly controls the
convergence of the integral de￿ning E[M] by implicitly generating a lower bound D(￿)>0
on consumption. An empirical ￿rst approximation of ￿ (normalized per capita) might be
given by conventional estimates of the value of a statistical human life, which may be too
small for the purposes at hand but will at least give some crude empirical idea of what is
implied numerically.
The parameter ￿ that is being used here to truncate the extent of catastrophic damages is
akin to the ￿fear of ruin￿coe¢ cient introduced by Aumann and Kurz (1977) to characterize
an individual￿ s ￿attitude toward risking his fortune￿in binary lotteries. Foncel and Treich
(2005) later analyzed this fear-of-ruin coe¢ cient and showed that it is basically the same
thing analytically as VSL. The particular utility function I use here is essentially identical
20(but with a di⁄erent purpose in a di⁄erent context) to a speci￿cation used recently by Hall
and Jones (2007), which, it was argued by them, explains broadly an array of stylized facts
about health spending while being roughly consistent with empirical VSL estimates.
The basic idea in terms of an application to my model here is that a society trading
o⁄ a decreased probability of its own catastrophic demise against the cost of lowering the
probability of that catastrophe is facing a decision problem conceptually analogous to how
people might make private trade-o⁄s between decreased consumption as against a lower
probability of their own personally-catastrophic end ￿which they do all the time. However
fanciful the use of a VSL-like parameter to close this model might seem in a context of global
climate change, other ways of closing this model seem even more fanciful, more arbitrary,
and more unnatural. In this spirit, suppose for the sake of developing the argument that
the analysis is allowed to proceed as if the treatment of the most catastrophic conceivable
impact of climate change is very roughly analogous to the simplest possible economic model
of the behavior of an individual who is trading o⁄ increased consumption against a slightly
increased probability of death.
Suppose D is some disastrously low value of consumption, conceptualized as representing
some kind of an analogue of a starvation level, below which level the individual dies. Let
the utility associated with death be normalized at zero. The utility function U(C;D) is





for C > D, and
U(C;D) = 0 (35)
for 0 ￿ C ￿ D.
Without loss of generality, current consumption is normalized as it was before at C = 1.
For simplicity, suppose the agent begins with something close to a zero probability of death
in the current period. Let A(q) be the amount of extra consumption the individual requires
within this period to exactly compensate for P[C ￿ D] = q within this period. In free
translation, q is the probability of death. From EU theory, A(q) satis￿es the equation
(1 ￿ q)U(1 + A(q);D) = U(1;D): (36)
Di⁄erentiating (36) with respect to q and evaluating at q=0 gives
￿U(1;D) + U
0(1;D)A
0(0) = 0: (37)
21The ￿value of statistical life￿(or, in the terminology here, the ￿VSL-like parameter￿ ) is
de￿ned as the rate of substitution between consumption and mortality risk, here being
￿ ￿ A
0(0): (38)
Equations (37), (38) can be inverted to give the implied lower bound on consumption D
as an implicit function of the VSL-like parameter ￿. Proceeding this way for the isoelastic
utility function (1) yields, after manipulation, the equation
D(￿) = [1 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿]
￿1=(￿￿1): (39)
In this paper I am interested in analyzing what happens for very large values of ￿. In
order for equation (39) to make sense in such situations by ensuring D(￿) > 0 requires here
that
1 + (￿ ￿ 1)￿ > 0; (40)
which can ￿essentially￿(up to limiting measure zero) hold for arbitrarily large values of ￿
only if
￿ > 1: (41)
In other words, for what it is worth the theory here is telling us that the large empirical
values of statistical life (relative to consumption), which seem to characterize our world, are
￿essentially￿compatible only with the strict relative risk aversion implied by (41).
Very rough ballpark estimates of the per-capita value of a statistical human life might
be of the order of magnitude of a hundred times per-capita consumption.7 From a wide
variety of empirical studies in disparate contexts, a plausible value of the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion might be two.8 For ￿=2, the value ￿ ￿ 100 plugged into formula (39) gives
D(100) ￿ :01. An interpretation of ￿ as a parameter representing the per-capita value
of statistical civilization or the value of statistical life on earth (as we currently know or
understand these concepts) may very well involve higher values of ￿ than ￿ 100 and lower
values of D than ￿ :01. In any event, I note here for further reference that a Monte Carlo
simulation assessing the EU impacts of losing up to 99% of welfare-equivalent consumption
7For this particular application of using a VSL-like parameter to analyze the extent of the worst imaginable
climate-change catastrophe, I think that the most one might hope for is accuracy to within about an order
of magnitude ￿anything more being false precision. Even the empirical estimates for the value of a much-
better-de￿ned statistical human life have a disturbingly wide range, but ￿ ￿ 100 is roughly consistent with
the meta-analysis in Bellavance, Dione, and Lebeau (2007) or the survey of Viscusi and Aldi (2003).
8This is the point estimate selected by Hall and Jones (2007) in a conceptually-similar model and defended
by them with references to a wide range of studies on page 61.
22in the far-distant dark reaches of a bad fat tail is very di⁄erent from any simulations now
being done with any existing empirical model or study of the economics of climate change.
Let E[M j ￿] represent the expected value of the stochastic discount factor for M(C)
given by formula (4) when C > D(￿) and with M(C)=0 when 0 ￿ C ￿ D(￿). The next
section explores what happens to E[M j ￿] for extremely large values of ￿.
6 The Dismal Theorem
The following ￿Dismal Theorem￿(hereafter sometimes abbreviated as ￿DT￿ ) shows that
E[M] ! +1 under quite general circumstances when there is structural uncertainty con-
cerning the unknown scaling parameter s ￿and when ￿ might be very big.
Theorem 1 For any given n and k,
lim
￿!1
E[M j ￿] = +1: (42)
Proof. 9Combining the interpretation of D(￿) with the appropriate modi￿cations of (33),
(32) ￿and tracing the link of equations all the way back to (25) ￿implies that



























Make the change of variable z = (y ￿ ￿)=s, use the fact from (39) that D(1) = 0, and
reverse the order of integration to rewrite (43) as
lim
￿!1





















Pick any value of z0 for which simultaneously z0 < 0 and ￿(z) > 0 in an open neighborhood









9This is only a loose sketch of the structure of a proof. It is being included here primarily to provide some
motivation for the formulas in the analysis that comes next and depend upon equation (45). In this spirit,
the purpose of this ￿proof sketch￿is to give at least a minimal quick-and-dirty indication of where (45) is
coming from. A rigorous proof can be built around the very signi￿cant (perhaps even seminal) contribution
of Michael Shwarz to decision making under extreme uncertainty. An important result proved in Schwarz
(1999) is that the tails of f(y) de￿ned by (32) are power-law of order n+k. From this fact, Theorem 1 then
rigorously follows along the lines sketched here.
23implying that expression (44) also approaches +1 as ￿ ! 1, which concludes this basic
sketch of a proof.
The underlying logic behind the strong result of Theorem 1 is described by the limiting
behavior of (45) for large values of s. Given any values of n and k, the probability of a
disaster declines polynomially in the scale s of the disaster from (45), while the marginal-
utility impact of a disaster increases exponentially in the scale s of the disaster. It is intuitive,
and can readily be proved, that the tail of the random variable Y essentially behaves like
the tail of the random variable S. Therefore, irrespective of the original parent distribution,
the e⁄ect of an uncertain scale parameter fattens the tail of the posterior-predictive child
distribution so that it behaves asymptotically like a power-law distribution whose power
coe¢ cient from (45) is n+k. In this sense, power-law tails need not be postulated, because
they are essentially unavoidable in posterior-predictive distributions. No matter the number
of observations, the race to the bottom of the bad tail between a polynomially-contracting
power-law probability times an exponentially-expanding marginal utility impact is won in
the limit every time by the marginal utility impact, so long as there is positive relative risk
aversion.10
In the model of this paper, people are averse to two types of indeterminacy ￿what might
be called the ￿risk￿of not knowing y given s, and what might be called the ￿uncertainty￿
of not knowing s. The Dismal Theorem can be interpreted as providing a rigorous sense
in which aversion to structural or deep ￿uncertainty￿(in the form of not knowing the scale
parameter s) is potentially far greater than aversion to the pure ￿risk￿of not knowing the
realized value of the growth-rate random variable y (but when s is known). However, it is
also true that the interpretation and application of Theorem 1 is sensitive to a subtle but
important behind-the-scene tug of war between pointwise-but-nonuniform limiting behavior
in ￿ and pointwise-but-nonuniform limiting behavior in n.
To see more clearly how the issue of ￿risk￿vs. ￿uncertainty￿plays out in determining
E[M] under pointwise-but-nonuniform convergence, suppose that, unbeknownst to the agent,
the true value of s is s￿. Since the prior p0(s) de￿ned by (29) assigns positive probability
to an open interval around s￿, the imposed speci￿cation has su¢ cient regularity for large-
sample likelihood dominance to cause strong (i.e., almost sure) convergence of the posterior
distribution (31) of S to its true data-generating value s = s￿. This in turn means that
10As stated here, DT depends upon an invariant prior of the polynomial form (29), but this is not much
of a limitation because k can be any number. To undo the in￿nite limit in (42) requires a noninvariant
prior that additionally approaches zero faster than any polynomial in 1=s (as s ! 1). In this case the limit
in (42) is a ￿nite number, but its (potentially arbitrarily large) value will depend critically upon the strong
a priori knowledge embodied in the presumed-known parameters of such a noninvariant prior ￿and the
prior-sensitivity message that such a formulation ends up delivering is very similar anyway to the message
delivered by the model of this paper.
24the posterior-predictive distribution of growth rates (32) converges strongly to its true data-
generating distribution h(y j s￿) and (for any given ￿<1) E[M j ￿] converges strongly to
its true value:












Condition (46) signi￿es that for any given ￿ < 1 (which via (39) puts a positive lower
bound D(￿) on C, and thereby a ￿nite upper bound on M), in the limit as full structural
knowledge is approached (because n ! 1) pure ￿risk￿is more important than structural
￿uncertainty.￿ What is happening here is that as the strength of inductive knowledge n
is increasing in the form of more and more data observations piling up, it is becoming in-
creasingly apparent that the probability of C being anywhere remotely as low as D(￿) is
ignorable ￿even after taking into account the possible EU impacts of disastrously-low utili-
ties. A conventional pure-risk-like application of thin-tail EU theory essentially corresponds
to a situation where there is enough inductive-plus-prior knowledge to identify the relevant
structure because n+k is reasonably large relative to the VSL-like parameter ￿ ￿and relative
to the much-less-controversial parameters ￿ and ￿.
Concerning the conventional parameters ￿ and ￿, we have at least some very rough idea
of what kinds of numbers might be empirically relevant. (For example, reasonable point
estimates might involve values of ￿ consistent with ￿ 99% per year and ￿ consistent with
￿ 2.) In complete contrast, any discussion about climate change concerning the empirically-
relevant value of the nonconventional VSL-like parameter ￿ (relative to n+k) belongs to a
much more abstract realm of discourse. It is therefore understandable to want climate-
change CBA to be restricted to dealing with worst-conceivable damages of, say for example,
￿20% of consumption (equivalent to picking D ￿ 4=5) ￿with anything worse than this
being disregarded (as being ￿too speculative￿or ￿not based on hard science￿ ) by chopping
o⁄ the rest of the bad tail, discarding it, and then forgetting about it. This is actually the
de facto strategy employed by most of those relatively few existing CBAs of climate change
that even bother to concern themselves at all with a formal treatment of uncertainty about
high-impact damages. Alas, to be con￿dent in the validity of such a cuto⁄ strategy in a
situation where we are grossly unsure about ￿ or D (relative to n+k) e⁄ectively requires
uniform convergence of E[M] for all (conceivable) values of ￿ or D. Otherwise, for any
given level of inductive-plus-prior knowledge n+k, a skeptical critic could always come back
and ask how robust is the CBA to the highly-unsure truncation value of D(￿). Similar
robustness questions apply to any a priori presumption or imposition of thin-tailed PDFs.
25In the spirit of the above discussion, it is critical here to note that with (46) the a.s.
convergence of E[M j ￿] to its true value is pointwise but not uniform in n. No matter how
much data-evidence n exists ￿or even can be imagined to exist ￿DT says that E[M j ￿] is
always exceedingly sensitive to very large values of ￿. In this sense, structural ￿uncertainty￿
always has the potential to trump pure ￿risk￿for situations of potentially-unlimited downside
exposure when no plausible bound D(￿)>0 can con￿dently be imposed by prior knowledge.
Here ￿risk￿ means that the data generating process is known exactly (only the outcome
is random), while ￿uncertainty￿ means that (as well as the outcome being random) the
parameters of the data generating process are unknown and must be estimated statistically.
This paper has stressed repeatedly the basic theme that no ￿nite sample can accurately
assess relative probabilities or magnitudes of the most extreme disasters lurking in the dark-
distant tails of distributions. The dominant statistical-economic truth behind DT is that
the expected utility of a Bayesian agent with strict relative risk aversion may be driven
to an arbitrarily large extent by this seemingly unavoidable limitation of learning-inference
unless potential exposure is somehow limited by prior information. The Dismal Theorem
can therefore be interpreted as implying a spirit in which it may be unnecessary to append
to the theory of decision making under uncertainty an ad hoc extra postulate of ￿ambiguity
aversion.￿ At least for situations where there is fundamental uncertainty about catastrophes
coexisting with a fear of ruin, EU theory itself already tells us precisely how the ￿ambiguity￿
of structural-parameter uncertainty can be especially important and why people may be
much more averse to it than to pure objective-frequency ￿risk.￿
The Dismal Theorem has both a general point and a particular application to the eco-
nomics of climate change. The general point is that Theorem 1 embodies a very strong
form of a ￿generalized precautionary principle￿for situations of potentially unlimited down-
side exposure. From experience alone one cannot acquire su¢ ciently accurate information
about the probabilities of disasters in the bad tail to make the expected marginal utility of
an extra sure unit of consumption become independent of the VSL-like parameter ￿thereby
potentially allowing this VSL-like-parameter aspect to dominate cost-bene￿t applications of
EU theory. To drive home the main theme of this paper yet again, the underlying general
problem that DT is illustrating concerns a fundamental limitation on the ability of empirical
learning or inductive knowledge to shed light on extreme events. Even in a stationary world,
it is not possible to learn enough about the frequency of tail events from ￿nite samples alone
to make expected stochastic discount factors be independent of arti￿cially-imposed bounds
on the extent of possibly-ruinous disasters.11
11This point comes across with much greater force in an evolutionary world based upon an analytically-
more-complicated nonstationary nonergodic stochastic process modeled along the lines of Weitzman (2007a).
26The part of the distribution of possible outcomes that can most readily be learned (from
inductive information that comes in a form as if conveyed by data) concerns the relatively-
more-likely outcomes in the body of the distribution. From previous experience, past ob-
servations, plausible interpolations or extrapolations, and perhaps even the law of large
numbers, there may be at least some modicum of con￿dence in being able to construct a
reasonable picture of the middle regions of the PDF. As we move towards probabilities in
the periphery of the distribution, however, we are increasingly moving into the unknown
territory of subjective uncertainty where our probability estimate of the probability distrib-
utions themselves becomes increasingly di⁄use because the frequencies of rare events in the
tails cannot be pinned down by previous experiences or past observations. Climate change
generally and climate sensitivity speci￿cally are prototype examples of this general principle,
because we are trying to extrapolate inductive knowledge far outside the range of limited
past experience from natural forcing experiments. Since the unknown scale parameter S
(whose uncertainty drives the economic analysis) is an abstract generalized version of an
amplifying multiplier whose role is very crudely analogous to the role of open-ended general-
ized climate sensitivity, it is then perhaps no accident or surprise that the empirical PDF of
climate sensitivity (which is, after all, based on inductive information from data and studies)
seemingly has a thick power-law-type tail.
7 What is the Dismal Theorem Trying to Tell Us?
Global climate change unfolds over a time scale of centuries and, through the power of
compound interest, a standard CBA of what to do now to mitigate GHGs is hugely sensitive
to the discount rate that is postulated. This has produced some sharp disagreements among
economists about what is an ￿ethical￿value of the rate of pure time preference ￿ (and the
CRRA coe¢ cient ￿) to use for intergenerational discounting in the deterministic version
(s = 0) of the Ramsey equation (8) that forms the analytical backbone for most studies of
the economics of climate change.12 For the model of this paper, which is based on structural
uncertainty, arguments about what values of ￿ to use in equation (7) or (8) translate into
arguments about what values of ￿ to use in the model￿ s structural-uncertainty generalization
of the Ramsey equation, which is the expectation formula (33). (A zero rate of pure time
12While this contentious intergenerational-discounting issue has long existed (see, e.g., the various essays
in Portney and Weyant (1999)), it has been elevated to recent prominence by publication of the controversial
Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change (2007). The Review argues for a base case of preference-
parameter values ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿ ￿ 1, on which its strong conclusions depend analytically. Alternative views
of intergenerational discounting are provided in, e.g., Dasgupta (2007), Nordhaus (2007), and Weitzman
(2007b). The last of these also contains a heuristic exposition of the contents of this paper, as well as giving
Stern some credit for emphasizing the great uncertainties associated with climate change.
27preference ￿ = 0 in (8) corresponds to ￿ = 1 in (33).) In this connection, Theorem 1 seems
to be saying that no matter what values of ￿ or ￿ are selected, so long as ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0
(equivalent to ￿ < 1), any big-￿ CBA of GHG-mitigation policy should be presumed (until
shown otherwise empirically) to be a⁄ected by deep structural uncertainty.
Expected utility theory is telling us here analytically that the debate about discounting
may be secondary to a debate about the open-ended catastrophic reach of climate disasters.
While it is always fair game to challenge the assumptions of a model, when theory provides
a generic result (like ￿free trade is Pareto optimal￿or ￿steady growth eventually outstrips
one-time change￿ ) the burden of proof is commonly taken as residing with whoever wants to
over-rule the theorem in a particular application. The take-away message here is that the
burden of proof in the economics of climate change is presumptively upon whoever wants to
model or conceptualize the expected present discounted utility of feasible trajectories under
greenhouse warming without considering that structural uncertainty might matter more than
discounting or pure risk per se. Such a body-of-the-distribution modeler should be prepared
to explain why the fattened bad tail of the posterior-predictive distribution is not empirically
relevant and does not play a signi￿cant role in the analysis.
A common reaction to the conundrum for CBA implied by the Dismal Theorem is to
acknowledge its mathematical logic but to wonder how it is to be used constructively for
deciding what to do in practice. After all, horror stories about theoretically-possible hypo-
thetical disasters can be told for many situations without this aspect necessarily paralyzing
decision-making (or freezing the status quo by e⁄ectively blocking all progress whenever
there exists a theoretical possibility of severe downside risks).
The Dismal Theorem says that in the limit as the VSL-like parameter becomes very large,
agents are willing to pay a very high price to eliminate deep uncertainty ￿a somewhat vexing
idea that is di¢ cult to wrap one￿ s mind around. Is this an incompleteness result showing that
the familiar ordinary form of CBA based on EU theory with known thin tails is somehow
nulli￿ed by a severe restriction on what inductive information can teach us about basic
structural uncertainty? Phrased di⁄erently, is DT an economics version of an impossibility
theorem which signi￿es that there are fat-tailed situations where economic analysis is up
against a strong constraint on the ability of any quantitative analysis to inform us without
committing to a VSL-like parameter and an empirical CBA framework that is based on some
explicit numerical estimates of the miniscule probabilities of all levels of catastrophic impacts
up to absolute disaster? And if ordinary thin-tailed CBA is thereby constrained, then
what are we supposed to use in its place? Even if it were true that DT represents a valid
economic-statistical precautionary principle which, at least theoretically, might dominate
decision making, would not putting into practice this ￿generalized precautionary principle￿
28freeze all progress if taken too literally? (Should we have foregone the industrial revolution
because of the GHGs it generated?) Considering the enormous inertias that are involved
in the buildup of GHGs and its warming consequences, is the possibility of learning and
mid-course corrections a plausible counterweight to DT? With such a severe barrier to what
we are able to say about extreme events in a situation of deep structural uncertainty (when
it is combined with practically unlimited potential for downside exposure), what should we
do when some kind of a policy response to a complex chaos-prone dynamic system like
climate change is required? How should the fat tail of climate uncertainty be compared
with the fat tails of various proposed solutions such as nuclear power, geoengineering, or
carbon sequestration at the bottom of the ocean? Ceterus paribus, DT suggests a more
cautious approach to GHG emissions, but how much more caution is warranted?
I simply do not know the full answers to the above wide range of legitimate questions
that DT raises. I don￿ t think anyone does. But I also don￿ t think that such questions can
just be brushed aside in good conscience. When uncertainty is formally considered at all in
climate change, the arti￿cial practice of using thin-tailed PDFs ￿especially the widespread
practice of imposing de mimimis low-probability-threshold cuto⁄s that casually dictate what
part of the high-impact bad tail is to be truncated and discarded from CBA ￿seems (to me)
arbitrary and problematic.13 In the spirit of the idea that the unsettling issues raised by
fat-tailed CBA for the economics of climate change must be addressed seriously, even while
admitting that we do not know all the answers, I tentatively o⁄er here some speculative
thoughts on what it all means.
Any interpretation or application of the Dismal Theorem is rendered exceedingly tricky
by the unusual (for economics) nonuniform convergence of E[M] or E[U] in all of its other
parameters relative to the key VSL-like parameter ￿. This nonuniform convergence enables
E[M] or E[U] to explode (for any other given parameter values) as ￿ ! 1. One might try
to argue that the values of E[M] or E[U] are ultimately an empirical matter to be decided
empirically (by analytical formulas or simulation results), with relevant parameter values
of ￿, n, k, ￿, ￿, ￿ and so forth being taken together as an empirically-plausible ensemble.
The idea that the values of E[M] or E[U] should depend on empirically-reasonable values
of ￿ and the other parameters is, of course, right on some level ￿and it sounds reassuring.
Yet, as a practical matter, the fact that E[M] and E[U] are so sensitive to large values
of ￿ (or small values of D, about which we can have little con￿dence in our own a priori
knowledge) casts a very long shadow over any empirical CBA of a situation to which DT
might apply. In ordinary run-of-the-mill limited-exposure thin-tailed situations, there is at
13Adler (2007) sketches out in some detail the many ways in which de mimimis low-probability-threshold
cuto⁄s are arbitrary and problematic in more-ordinary regulatory settings.
29least the underlying theoretical reassurance that ￿nite-cuto⁄-based CBA might (at least in
principle) be an arbitrarily-close approximation to something that is accurate and objective.
In fat-tailed unlimited-exposure DT situations, by contrast, there is no such theoretical
assurance underpinning the arbitrary cuto⁄s, which is ultimately due to the lack of uniform
convergence of E[M] or E[U] with respect to ￿ or D.
One does not want to abandon lightly the ideal that CBA should bring independent
empirical discipline to any application by being based upon empirically-reasonable parame-
ter values. Even when the Dismal Theorem might apply, CBA based upon empirically-
reasonable functional forms and parameter values (including ￿) might reveal useful informa-
tion. At the same time, one does not want to be obtuse by insisting that DT per se makes
no practical di⁄erence for CBA because the VSL-like coe¢ cient ￿ is in any event just an-
other parameter whose value is to be determined empirically and then simply plugged into
the analysis along with some guesses about the ￿damages function￿for high-temperature
catastrophes (combined with speculative extreme-tail probabilities). So some sort of a
tricky balance is required between being overawed by DT into abandoning CBA altogether
and being underawed by DT into insisting that it is just another empirical issue to be sorted
out by business-as-usual CBA.
The degree to which the kind of ￿generalized precautionary principle￿embodied in the
Dismal Theorem is relevant for a particular application must be decided on a case-by-case
￿rule of reason￿basis. It depends generally upon the extent to which prior ￿-knowledge
(and prior k-knowledge) combine with inductive-posterior n-knowledge in a particular case
to fatten or to thin the bad tail. In the particular application to the economics of climate
change, with so obviously limited data and limited experience about the catastrophic reach
of climate extremes, to ignore or suppress the signi￿cance of rare tail disasters is to ignore
or suppress what economic-statistical decision theory is telling us here loudly and clearly is
potentially the most important part of the analysis.
There exist perhaps half a dozen or so serious ￿nightmare scenarios￿ of environmen-
tal disasters perhaps comparable in conceivable worst-case impact to catastrophic climate
change. These might include: biotechnology, nanotechnology, asteroids, strangelets, pan-
demics, runaway computer systems, nuclear proliferation.14 It may well be that each of
these possibilities of environmental catastrophe deserves its own CBA application of DT
along with its own empirical assessment of how much probability measure is in the extreme
tails around D(￿). Even if this were true, however, it would not lessen the need to reckon
with the strong potential implications of DT for CBA in the particular case of climate change.
Perhaps it is no more than just an intuition, but for what it is worth I do not feel that
14Many of these are discussed in Posner (2004), Sunstein (2007), and Parson (2007).
30the handful of other conceivable environmental catastrophes are nearly as critical as climate
change. Let me illustrate some of what I have in mind with two speci￿c examples. The ￿rst
example is the widespread cultivation of crops based upon bioengineered genetically-modi￿ed
organisms (GMOs). At ￿rst glance, climate-change catastrophes and bioengineering disas-
ters might casually appear to be similar. In both cases, there is deep unease about arti￿cial
tinkering with the natural environment, which can generate frightening tales of a world
turned upside down and a planet that has been ruined by human activity. Suppose for
the sake of speci￿city that in the case of GMOs the overarching fear of disaster concerns
the possibility that widespread cultivation of so-called ￿Frankenfood￿could somehow allow
bioengineered genes to escape into the wild and wreak havoc on delicate ecosystems and
native populations (including, perhaps, humans), which have been ￿ne-tuned by millions of
years of natural selection. At the end of the day I think that the potential for environmental
disaster with Frankenfood is much less than the potential for environmental disaster with
climate change ￿along the lines of the following loose and oversimpli￿ed reasoning.
I think that in the case of Frankenfoods interfering with wild organisms that have evolved
by natural selection, there is at least some basic underlying principle that plausibly dampens
the extent of catastrophic jumping of arti￿cial DNA from cultivars to landraces. After
all, nature herself has already tried endless combinations of mutated DNA and genes over
countless millions of years, and what has evolved in the ￿erce battle for survival is only an
in￿nitesimal subset of the very ￿ttest permutations. In this regard there exists at least
some inkling of a prior argument making it fundamentally implausible that Frankenfood
arti￿cially selected for traits that humans ￿nd desirable will compete with or genetically alter
the wild types that nature has selected via Darwinian survival of the ￿ttest. Wild types have
already experienced innumerable small-step genetic mutations perhaps comparable to large-
step human-induced arti￿cial modi￿cations ￿ and these natural small-step modi￿cations
have already been shown not to have survival value in the wild. I think that analogous
arguments may also apply for invasive ￿superweeds,￿ which (at least so far) represent a
minor cultivation problem and have not shown any ability to displace landraces. Besides
all this, and importantly in this context, safeguards in the form of so-called ￿terminator
genes￿can be inserted into the DNA of GMOs, which directly prevents GMO genes from
reproducing themselves.
A second relevant example of comparing climate change with another potential catastro-
phe concerns the possibility of a large asteroid hitting Earth. In the asteroid case it seems
plausible to assume there is much more prior plus inductive knowledge k+n pinning down
the probabilities to very small values. If we use P[￿T > 10￿C] ￿ 2% as the very rough prob-
ability of a climate-change disaster occurring within the next 200 years, then this is roughly
31four orders of magnitude larger than the probability of a large asteroid impact occurring
within the same time period.
Contrast the above discussion about the plausible limits of the magnitude or probabil-
ity of a disaster in the case of genetic engineering or asteroid collisions with the situation
of possibly-catastrophic climate change. The climate-change ￿experiment,￿ whose even-
tual outcome we are trying to infer now, concerns the planet￿ s response to a geologically-
instantaneous exogenous injection of GHGs. Such a ￿planetary experiment￿of an exogenous
injection of this much GHGs this fast seems unprecedented in Earth￿ s history stretching back
perhaps even billions of years. Can anyone honestly say now, from very limited information
or experience, what are reasonable upper bounds on the eventual global warming or climate
change that we are currently trying to infer will be the outcome of such a ￿rst-ever plane-
tary experiment? What we do know about climate science and extreme tail probabilities is
that planet Earth hovers in an unstable climate equilibrium15, chaotic dynamics cannot by
any means be ruled out, and all twenty-two current studies of climate sensitivity cited by
IPCC4 (2007) aggregated together are estimating on average that P[S1 >7￿C] ￿ 4-5%. To
my mind this open-ended aspect with a way-too-high subjective probability makes GHG-
induced global climate change vastly more worrisome than global cultivation of Frankenfood
or the possibility of colliding with a large asteroid.
I think these two examples perhaps suggest that it may (barely) be possible to make
a few meaningful distinctions among the handful of situations where the Dismal Theorem
might conceivably apply seriously. My discussion here is hardly conclusive, so that we surely
cannot rule out a biotech or asteroid disaster (and therefore should undertake appropriate
precautions in both cases) However, I would say on the basis of this line of argument
that such disasters seem to me very very unlikely, whereas a climate disaster seems to me
￿only￿very unlikely. In the language of this paper, synthetic biology or large asteroids
feel to me more like high-(k+n) situations relative to climate change, which by comparison
feels to me more like a low-(k+n) situation. It is true that a climate-change catastrophe
develops more slowly than some other potential catastrophes and there is perhaps somewhat
more chance for learning and mid-course corrections relative to, say, biotechnology (but not
necessarily relative to asteroids when a good tracking system is in place). So the possibility
of ￿learning by doing￿may be a more distinctive feature of climate change disasters than
some other disasters and in that sense deserves to be part of an optimal climate-change
policy. This being said, the climate response to GHGs has tremendous built-in inertial
lags and I don￿ t think there is a smoking gun in the biotechnology, asteroid, or any other
catastrophe scenario quite like the idea that ￿perhaps just maybe￿P[S2 >10￿C] ￿ 2%.
15On the nature of this unstable climate equilibrium, see Hansen et al (2007).
32I have tried to make two examples contrasting climate change with synthetic biology
and large asteroids. I have further tried to argue that climate change looks far more
dangerous than either of these other two examples of catastrophic possibilities. However,
these examples are intended more to illustrate a possible thought process than to render a
￿nal judgement. The applicability of DT to each catastrophe scenario must be decided on
a case by case basis. To repeat, the overarching principle here is that the mere fact that
DT might also apply to a few other environmental catastrophes, like maybe biotechnology
or asteroids, does not constitute a valid reason for excluding it from applying to climate
change.
8 Possible Implications for Climate-Change Policy
Many situations have natural limited-exposure-like bounds on the possible damages that
might materialize, for which the theory of this paper may be less relevant or perhaps even
have no relevance. When a particular type of idiosyncratic uncertainty a⁄ects only one small
part of an individual￿ s or a society￿ s overall portfolio of assets, exposure is naturally limited
to that speci￿c component and tail fatness is not such a paramount concern. But a few
very important real-world situations have potentially unlimited exposure due to structural
uncertainty about their potentially open-ended catastrophic reach. Climate change poten-
tially a⁄ects the whole worldwide portfolio of utility by threatening to drive all of planetary
welfare to disastrously low levels in the most extreme scenarios. This paper shows that the
EU analysis of those relatively few deep-uncertainty situations with potentially catastrophic
reach ￿like climate change ￿can give very di⁄erent conclusions than what might emerge
from a typical CBA of a more ordinary limited-exposure situation. The conclusions can
even be very di⁄erent from what would come out of a conventional Monte Carlo simulation
of a model whose core structure resembles the model of this paper but with a discrete-grid
approximation or with a ￿nite number of runs. The dismal outcome embodied in Theorem
1 of this paper can be approached by a Monte Carlo simulation only as a double limit where
the grid size and the number of runs both go to in￿nity.
A so-called ￿Integrated Assessment Model￿(hereafter ￿IAM￿ ) for climate change is a
multiple-equation computer-simulated model that combines dynamic economics with geo-
physical and geochemical circulation dynamics for purposes of analyzing the economic im-
pacts of global climate change. An IAM is essentially a model of economic growth with a
controllable GHG-driven externality of endogenous greenhouse warming. IAMs have proven
themselves indispensable for understanding the economics of climate change ￿if for no other
reason than being able to describe outcomes from a complicated interplay of the long lags
33and big inertias that are involved. Most existing economic analyses of climate change treat
central forecasts of damages as if they were certain, or, if they address uncertainty at all, use
thin-tailed PDFs including, especially, truncation of PDFs at arbitrary cuto⁄s. All existing
IAMs treat high-temperature damages by an extremely casual extrapolation of whatever is
assumed to be the low-temperature ￿damages function.￿ The high-temperature ￿damages
function￿extrapolated from the low-temperature ￿damages function￿is incredibly sensitive
to assumed functional forms and parameter values because an extraordinarily wide variety of
functions can be made to ￿t nearly-identically the low-temperature damages that have been
assumed by the modeler. For example, most ￿damages functions￿reduce welfare-equivalent
consumption by the quadratic multiplier 1=[1 + ￿(￿T)2], for which form there was never
any more compelling rationale in the ￿rst place than the casual acquaintance of economists
with the familiar quadratic loss function. I would argue strongly on a priori grounds that a
far better functional form for this multiplier is exp(￿￿(￿T)2) ￿because ￿dC=C _ d(￿T)2
makes a lot more sense to me at high temperatures than ￿dC=C _ d(￿T)2=(￿T)2. The
value of ￿ required for calibrating welfare-equivalent consumption at ￿T = 3￿C to be, say,
98% of consumption at ￿T = 0￿C is so miniscule that the two functional forms give virtually
identical results for relatively small values of ￿T ￿ 6￿C, but at ever higher temperatures
they gradually yet ever-increasingly diverge. With a fat-tailed PDF of ￿T, there is a pro-
found di⁄erence between these two functional forms in the implied willingness to pay (WTP)
to avoid or reduce uncertainty in ￿T. With the multiplier exp(￿￿(￿T)2), as the VSL-like
parameter ￿ ! 1, in the limit WTP!100%. To summarize this line of argument: when
viewed in the light of the Dismal Theorem, most conventional climate-change IAMs have
serious limitations that have not yet been su¢ ciently recognized or acknowledged.
Samplings based upon conventional Monte Carlo simulations of the economics of climate
change with any existing IAM may give a very misleading picture of the EU consequences of
alternative GHG-mitigation policies.16 The core underlying problem is that while it might
be true in expectations that utility-equivalent damages of climate change are enormous, when
chasing a fat tail this will not be true for the overwhelming bulk of Monte Carlo realizations.
To see this most clearly in a crisp thought experiment, imagine what would happen to the
simple stripped-down model of this paper in the hands of a Monte Carlo IAM simulator.
A ￿nite grid may not reveal the true expected stochastic discount factor or true expected
discounted utility in simulations of this model (even in the limit of an in￿nite number of runs)
because the most extreme negative impacts in the fattened tails will have been truncated
16Tol (2003) showed the empirical relevance of this issue in some actual IAM simulations. I am grateful
to Richard Carson for suggesting the inclusion of an explicit discussion of why a Monte Carlo simulation
may fail to account fully for the implications of uncertain large impacts with small probabilities.
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set of all possible values of consumption-equivalent outcomes from all conceivable negative
impacts. Such arbitrarily-imposed de minimis threshold-cuto⁄ truncations are typically
justi￿ed (when anyone bothers to justify them at all) on the thin-tailed frequentist logic
that probabilities of extremely rare events are statistically insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero
￿and hence can be ignored. This logic might conceivably su¢ ce for known thin tails, but
the conclusion is highly incorrect for the rare and unusual class of fat-tailed potentially-
high-impact economic problems to which climate change seemingly belongs. Back-of-the-
envelope calculations cited earlier in this paper appear to indicate that the validity of a
Monte Carlo simulation of the economics of climate change requires seriously probing into
the implications of disastrous temperatures and catastrophic impacts in incremental steps
that might conceivably cause up to a 99% (or maybe even more) decline of welfare-equivalent
consumption before the modeler is allowed to cut o⁄ the rest of the bad fat tail and discard
it in good conscience. This paper says that any climate-change IAM that does not go out
on a limb by explicitly stating and including in a Monte Carlo simulation the ultra-miniscule
but fat-tailed probabilities of ultra-catastrophic impacts (down to about one percent or so of
current welfare-equivalent consumption, which is equivalent to damages of 99% or so) is in
possible violation of best-practice economic analysis because (by ignoring the extreme tails)
it could constitute a serious misapplication of EU theory. The policy relevance of any CBA
coming out of such a thin-tail-based model might then remain under a very dark cloud until
this fat-tail issue is addressed seriously and resolved empirically.17
An additional consideration is that a ￿nite sample of Monte Carlo simulations may not
reveal true expected utility in this model (even in the limit of an in￿nite grid) because
the limited sample may not be able to go deep enough into the fattened tails where the
most extreme damages are. Nor will typical sensitivity analysis of Monte Carlo simulations
necessarily penetrate su¢ ciently far into the fattened-tail region to represent accurately
the EU consequences of disastrous damages. For any IAM (which presumably has a core
structure resembling the model of this paper), special precautions are required to ensure that
Monte Carlo simulations represent accurately the low-utility impacts of fat-tailed PDFs.
Instead of the existing IAM emphasis on estimating or simulating the economic impacts
of what are e⁄ectively the more plausible climate-change scenarios, to at least compensate
partially for ￿nite-sample bias the model of this paper calls for a dramatic oversampling
(relative to probability of occurrence) of those strati￿ed climate-change scenarios associated
17Several back-of-the-envelope numerical examples, available upon request, indicate to my own satisfaction
that the fat-tail e⁄ect is likely to be signi￿cant for at least some reasonable parameter values and functional
forms. However, serious IAM-based numerical simulations of fat-tail e⁄ects on the economics of climate
change have not yet been done and are more properly the subject of another more-empirical paper.
35with the most adverse imaginable economic impacts in the bad fat tail. With limited sam-
pling resources for the big IAMs, Monte Carlo analysis could be used much more creatively
￿not necessarily to defend a speci￿c policy result, but to experiment seriously with what
happens to the outcomes with fat-tailed uncertainty in the limit as the grid size and num-
ber of runs simultaneously increase. Of course this emphasis on sampling climate-change
scenarios in proportion to marginal-utility-weighted probabilities of occurrence forces us to
estimate subjective probabilities down to extraordinarily tiny levels and also to put utility
weights on disasters with damage impacts up to perhaps being welfare-equivalent to losing
99% of consumption ￿but that is the price we must be willing to pay for having a genuine
economic analysis of potentially-catastrophic climate change.
In situations of potentially unlimited damage exposure ￿like climate change ￿a reframing
of the focus of economic analysis might be appropriate, with more emphasis on even a
slightly better treatment of the worst-case tail extremes (and what might be done about
them, at what cost) relative to re￿ning the calibration of merely-likely outcomes or arguing
over discount rates. A clear implication of this paper is that greater research e⁄ort is
relatively ine⁄ectual when it is targeted at describing and estimating the central tendencies
of what we already know relatively well about the economics of climate change in the more-
plausible scenarios. A much more fruitful goal of research in my opinion is to aim at
understanding even slightly better the deep uncertainty (which potentially permeates the
economic analysis) concerning the less plausible scenarios located in the bad fat tail. I also
believe that an important complementary research goal that emerges from this paper is the
desperate need to comprehend much better all of the options for dealing with high-impact
climate-change extremes, which should include undertaking well-funded detailed studies and
experiments about the feasibility, possible environmental side e⁄ects, and cost-e⁄ectiveness
of geoengineering options to slim down the bad fat tail quickly in emergency-runaway cases
where things might be beginning to get out of hand.18
When analyzing the economics of climate change, perhaps it might be possible to reason
somewhat by analogy with insurance for extreme events and to compare, say, a homeowner￿ s
cost of buying ￿re insurance or a young adult￿ s cost of buying life insurance with the cost
to the world economy of buying an insurance policy going some way towards mitigating the
extreme high-temperature possibilities. On a U.S. national level, rough comparisons could
18It is a secret well kept within the climate-change community of scholars that (with the unfortunately-
limited information we currently possess) geoengineering via injection of stratospheric sulfate aerosol precur-
sors looks at ￿rst glance now like an incredibly cheap and e⁄ective way to slim down the bad fat tail quickly
in case of emergency, but with largely unknown and conceivably nasty unintended consequences that we
need to understand much better. For more on the economics of geoengineering, see Barrett (2007). In my
opinion there is an acute ￿even desperate ￿need for much more extensive research on (and experimentation
with) various geoengineering options for dealing with potential runaway climate change.
36perhaps be made with the potentially-huge payo⁄s, small probabilities, and signi￿cant costs
involved in countering terrorism, building anti-ballistic missile shields, or neutralizing hostile
dictatorships that might harbor weapons of mass destruction. A crude natural metric for
calibrating cost estimates of climate-change environmental-insurance policies might be that
the U.S. already spends approximately 3% of national income on the cost of a clean environ-
ment.19 All of this having been said, the bind we ￿nd ourselves in now on climate change
starts from a high-￿, low-k situation to begin with, and is characterized by extremely slow
convergence in n of inductive knowledge towards resolving the deep uncertainties ￿relative
to the lags and irreversibilities from not acting before structure is more fully identi￿ed.20
The point of all of this is that economic analysis is not completely helpless in the presence
of deep structural uncertainty and potentially unlimited exposure. The analysis is much
more frustrating and much more subjective ￿and it looks much less conclusive ￿because
it requires some form of speculation (masquerading as an ￿assessment￿ ) about the extreme
bad-fat-tail probabilities and utilities. Compared with the thin-tailed case, CBA of fat-
tailed potential catastrophes is inclined to favor paying a lot more attention to learning how
fat the bad tail might be and ￿if the tail is discovered to be too heavy for comfort after the
learning process ￿is a lot more open to at least considering undertaking serious mitigation
measures (including, perhaps, geoengineering) to slim it down. This paying attention to
the feasibility of slimming down overweight tails is likely to be a perennial theme in the
economic analysis of catastrophes. The key economic issues here are: what is the cost of
such a tail-slimming weight-loss program and how much of the bad fat does it remove from
the overweight tail?
9 Conclusion
Last section￿ s valiant attempts at doling out constructive suggestions notwithstanding, it
is painfully apparent that the Dismal Theorem makes economic analysis trickier and more
open-ended in the presence of deep structural uncertainty ￿and there is no sense pretending
otherwise. The economics of fat-tailed catastrophes raises di¢ cult conceptual issues which
cause the analysis to appear less scienti￿cally conclusive and to look more contentiously
subjective than what comes out of an empirical CBA of more-usual thin-tailed situations.
But if this is the way things are with fat tails, then this is the way things are, and it is a
fact to be lived with rather than a fact to be evaded just because it looks less scienti￿cally
19U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1990), executive summary projections for 2000 updated and
extrapolated by me to 2007.
20For more details about slow convergence in n, see Roe and Baker (2007)
37objective in cost-bene￿t applications. Perhaps in the end the economist can help most by
not presenting a cost-bene￿t estimate for a fat-tailed situation with potentially unlimited
downside exposure as if it is accurate and objective ￿and not even presenting the analysis
as if it is an approximation to something that is accurate and objective ￿but instead by
stressing more the fact that such an estimate might conceivably be arbitrarily inaccurate
depending upon what is subjectively assumed about the high-temperature ￿damages func-
tion￿along with assumptions about the fatness of the tails and where they have been cut o⁄.
This is unsatisfying and not what economists are used to doing, but in rare situations like
climate change where the Dismal Theorem applies we may be deluding ourselves and others
with misplaced concreteness if we think that we are able to deliver anything much more
precise than this with even the biggest and most-detailed climate-change IAMs as currently
constructed and deployed.
The contribution of this paper is to phrase exactly and to prove rigorously a basic the-
oretical principle that holds under positive relative risk aversion and potentially unlimited
exposure. In principle, what might be called the catastrophe-insurance aspect of such a fat-
tailed unlimited-exposure situation, which can never be fully learned away, may dominate
the social-discounting aspect, the pure-risk aspect, or the consumption-smoothing aspect.
Even if this principle in and of itself does not provide an easy answer to questions about how
much catastrophe insurance to buy (or even an easy answer in practical terms to the question
of what exactly is catastrophe insurance buying for climate change or other applications), I
believe it still might provide a useful way of framing the economic analysis of catastrophes.
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